Abstract. In this paper we systematically study the differential properties of addition modulo ¤ ¦ ¥ . We derive § © -time algorithms for most of the properties, including differential probability of addition. We also present log-time algorithms for finding good differentials. Despite the apparent simplicity of modular addition, the best known algorithms require naive exhaustive computation. Our results represent a significant improvement over them. In the most extreme case, we present a complexity reduction from ! ¤ # " ¥ to § © $ % .
results will facilitate cryptanalysis of such stream ciphers and hash functions that use addition and XOR at the same time.
Importance of Differential Properties of Addition. Originally, DC was considered with respect to XOR, and was generalized to DC with respect to an arbitrary group operation in [LMM91] . In 1992, Berson [Ber92] observed that for many primitive operations, it is significantly more difficult to apply DC with respect to XOR than with respect to addition modulo Until now it has seemed that the problem of evaluating the differential properties of addition with respect to XOR is hard. Hereafter, we omit the "with respect to XOR" and take the addition to be always modulo
. The fastest known algorithms for computing the differential probability of addition .) It means that block ciphers that employ both XOR and addition modulo
& '
are hard to evaluate the security against DC due to the lack of theory. This has led to the general concern that mixed use of XOR and modular addition might add more confusion (in Shannon's sense) to a cipher but "none has yet demonstrated to have a clear understanding of how to produce any proof nor convincing arguments of the advantage of such an approach" [Knu99] . One could say that they also add more confusion to the cipher in the layman's sense.
There has been significant ongoing work on evaluating the security of such "confusing" block ciphers against differential attacks. Some of these papers have also somewhat focused on the specific problem of evaluating the differential properties of addition. The full version of [BS91b] treated some differential probabilities of addition modulo
and included a few formulas useful to compute 5 7 6 8 , but did not include any concrete algorithms nor estimations of their complexities. The same is true for many later papers that analyzed ciphers like RC5, SAFER, and IDEA. Miyano [Miy98] studied the simpler case with one addend fixed and derived a linear-time algorithm for computing the corresponding differential probability.
Our Results. We develop a framework that allows the extremely efficient evaluation of many interesting differential properties of modular addition. In particular, most of the algorithms described herein run in time, sublinear in in unit time, as almost all contemporary microprocessors do.
The choice of this model is clearly motivated by the popularity of such microprocessors. Still, for several problems (although sometimes implicitly) we also describe linear-time algorithms that might run faster in hardware. (Moreover, the linear-time algorithms are usually easier to understand and hence serve an educational purpose.) Nevertheless, the RAM model was chosen to be "minimal", such that the described algorithms would be directly usable on as many platforms as possible. On the other hand, we immediately demonstrate the power of this model by describing some useful log-time algorithms (namely, for the Hamming weight, all-one parity and common alternation parity). They become very useful later when we investigate other differential properties. One of them (for the common alternation parity) might be interesting by itself; we have not met this algorithm in the literature.
After describing the model and the necessary tools, we show that
can be computed in time
in the worst-case. The corresponding algorithm has two principal steps. The first step checks in constant-time whether the differential
is impossible (i.e., whether in the average-case. These results can be further used for impossible differential cryptanalysis, since the best previously known general algorithm to find non-trivial impossible differentials was by exhaustive search. Moreover, the high density of impossible differentials makes differential cryptanalysis more efficient; most of the wrong pairs can be filtered out [BS91a,O'C95].
Furthermore, we compute the explicit probabilities
. This helps us to compute the distribution of the random variable T z r G I 5 6 8 @ z ( R , and to create formulas for the expected value and variance of the random variable . Based on this knowledge, one can easily compute the probabilities that
For the practical success of differential attacks it is not always sufficient to pick a random differential hoping it will be "good" with reasonable probability. It would be nice to find good differentials efficiently in a deterministic way. Both cipher designers and cryptanalysts are especially interested in finding the "optimal" differentials that result in the maximum differential probabilities and therefore in the best possible attacks. For this purpose we describe a log-time algorithm for computing
and a P that achieves this probability. Both the structure of the algorithm (which makes use of the all-one parity) and its proof of correctness are nontrivial. We also describe a logtime algorithm that finds a pair
that maximizes the double-maximum differential probability 5 7 6
9 8 % C @ B w R
. We show that for many nonzero B -s,
is very close to one. A summary of some of our results is presented in Table 1 . Road map. We give some preliminaries in Sect. 2. Section 3 describes a unit-cost RAM model, and introduces the reader to several efficient algorithms that are crucial for the later sections. In Sect. 4 we describe a log-time algorithm for 5 6 8
. Section 5 gives formulas for the density of impossible differentials and other statistical properties of 5 6 8
. Algorithms for maximum differential probability and related problems are described in Sect. 6.
Preliminaries
, let
be the -th coordinate of
). We always assume that
-bit bitwise "XOR", "OR", "AND" and "negation", respectively. Let
) denote the right (resp. the left) shift by 
) and
. For example,
, of addition g 9 i q is defined recursively as follows. First,
is a function of the sum
.) The following is a basic property of addition modulo
Differential Probability of Addition. We define the differential of addition modulo
as a triplet of two input and one output differences, denoted as
, where
. The differential probability of addition is defined as follows:
That is,
. We say that z is impossible if Lemma 1.
Probability Theory. Let be a discrete random variable. Except for a few explicitly mentioned cases, we always deal with uniformly distributed variables. We note that in the binomial distribution,
, for some fixed u m å à ae 2 and any
. From the basic axioms of probability,°'
. Moreover, the expectation 
RAM Model and Some Useful Algorithms
In the ) -bit unit-cost RAM model, some subset of fixed ) -bit operations can be executed in constant time. In the current paper, we specify this subset to be a small set of ) -bit instructions, all of which are readily available in the vast majority of contemporary microprocessors: Boolean operations, addition, and the constant shifts. We additionally allow unit-cost equality tests and (conditional) jumps. On the other hand, our model does not include table look-ups or (say) multiplications. Such a restriction guarantees that algorithms efficient in this model are also efficient on a very broad class of platforms, including FPGA and other hardware. This is further emphasized by the fact that our algorithms need only a few bytes of extra memory and thus a very small circuit size in hardware implementations.
Many algorithms that we derive in the current paper make heavy use of the three non-trivial functions described below. The power of our minimal computational model is stressed by the fact that all three functions can be computed in time
Hamming Weight. The first function is the Hamming weight function (also known as the population count or, sometimes, as sideways addition)
.e., î ï counts the "one" bits in an ) -bit string. In the unit-cost RAM model,
steps. Many textbooks contain (a variation of) the next algorithm that we list here only for the sake of completeness.
INPUT:
e ô e ô e ô s ô e ô e ô s õ ( R ; 2. , and then find
table look-ups. This method is faster than the method described in the previous paragraph if
, which is the case if
. However, it also requires more memory. While we do not discuss this method hereafter, our implementations use it, since it offers better performance on 32-bit processors.
, and 4 ' 6 5
is even. Since (mostly known as the population count instruction): SADD on the Mark I (sic), CX XA on the CDC Cyber series, A PSA on the Cray X-MP, VPCNT on the NEC SX-4, CTPOP on the Alpha 21264, POPC on the Ultra SPARC, POPCNT on the Intel IA64, etc. In principle, we could incorporate in our model a unit-time population count instruction, then several later presented algorithms would run in constant time. However, since there is no population count instruction on most of the other architectures (especially on the widespread Intel IA32 platform), we have decided not include it in the set of primitive operations. Moreover, the complexity of population count does not significantly influence the (average-case) complexity of the derived algorithms.
All-one and Common Alternation Parity. The second and third functions, important for several derived algorithms (more precisely, they are used in Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5), are the all-one and common alternation parity of ) -bit strings, defined as follows. (Note that while the Hamming weight has very many useful applications in cryptography, the functions defined in this section have never been, as far as we know, used before for any cryptographic or other purpose.)
The all-one parity of an
iff the longest sequence of consecutive one-bits
has odd length.
The common alternation parity of two
with the next properties:
, where F ® is the length of the longest common alternating bit chain
. (In both cases, counting starts with one. E.g., if
For both the all-one and common alternation parity we will also need their "duals" (denoted as Ï Ì C B S R and E T R ), obtained by bit-reversing their arguments. That is,
. (See Fig. 1.) Note that for every 
Log-time Algorithm for Differential Probability of Addition
In this section we say that differential
.) The next algorithm has a simple linear-time version, suitable for "manual cryptanalysis": (1) Check, whether 
Rest of this subsection consists of a step-by-step proof of this result, where we use the Lemma 1, i.e., that
We first state and prove two auxiliary lemmas. After that we show how Theorem 1 follows from them, and present two corollaries.
. Then
Proof. We denote
is symmetric in the three pairs n yB
. The claim follows since
In particular,
Proof. 1) Let z be possible but not "good". By Lemma 1, there exists an and a pair
. But by Lemma 2,
, which is a contradiction. 2) Let z be "good". We prove the theorem by induction on , by simultaneously proving the induction invariant
). Straightforward from Property 1 and the definition of a "good" differential. STEP (
| i k 2 t h u
). We assume that the invariant is true for . In particular, there exists a pair The next two corollaries follow straightforwardly from Algorithm 2 Corollary 1. . 2) For every
7 6 9 8 is symmetric in its arguments. That is, for an arbitrary triple
Proof. We say that
, and 
by the structure of Algorithm 2. 1) The corresponding carries 
Statistical Properties of Differential Probability
Note that Algorithm 2 has two principal steps. The first step is a constant-time check of whether the differential
is impossible (i.e., whether 
of the possible differentials, since its average-case complexity (where the average is taken over uniformly and random chosen differentials
. This is one (but certainly not the only or the most important) motivation for the current section. 
2) Let
be an arbitrary differential and let
) be convenient shorthands. Since ) are pairwise independent.
1) From Theorem 1,
. First, clearly, for any
. According to Algorithm 2,
, where we used the fact that
, and hence
Corollary 3. Algorithm 2 has average-case complexity
), while the random variable (e.g., the probabilities that
) by using standard methods from probability theory.
One can double-check the correctness of Theorem 2 by verifying that
, which agrees with Theorem 2. We next compute the variance of . Clearly,
, and therefore
. Next, by using Theorem 2 and the basic properties of the binomial distribution,
. Therefore,
Note that the density of possible differentials 
Algorithms for Finding Good Differentials of Addition
The last section described methods for computing the probability that a randomly picked differential z has high differential probability. While this alone might give rise to successful differential attacks, it would be nice to have an efficient deterministic algorithm for finding differentials with high differential probability. This section gives some relevant algorithms for this.
Linear-time Algorithm for
» ¶ X
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In this subsection, we will describe an algorithm that, given an input difference 
achieving (1) we must first fix
, and after that recursively guarantee that P e ® obtains the predicted value whenever
. This, and minimizing the number of bad -s can be done recursively for every
is bad independently of the value of
Moreover, either choice of P places no restriction on choosing
. This means that we can assign either
. The situation is more complicated if
is even, then the choice
(as compared to the choice , and hence is to be preferred over the second one. We leave the full details of the proof to the reader. 
, and as seen from the proof of Theorem 3, in many cases we can choose the output difference P e ® so that , with some additional care taken about the lowest bits. Let F R be the bit-reverse of F (i.e., F R ® is equal to the length of longest common alternating chain
Step 7 computes P e ® (again, "approximately") as (1)
and (3)
. Since the two last cases are sound, according to Algorithm 3, we are now left to prove that the first choice makes P optimal. But this choice means that in every maximum-length common alternating bit chain
, Algorithm 4 chooses all bits
, to be equal to
. By approximately the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3, this choice gives rise to 
, it has to be the case that either
. In the first case, both choices of
bad. In the second case we must later take 
in their differential cryptanalysis of FEAL in [BS91b] . Often this value is significantly smaller than the maximum differential probability
. However, since FEAL only uses f -bit addition, it is possible to find
-optimal output differences P by exhaustive search. This has been done, for example, in [AKM98] .
Log-time Algorithm for Double-Maximum Differential Probability
We next show that the double-maximum differential probability ).
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